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Coastal Land Loss and the Mitigation–Adaptation 
Dilemma: Between Scylla and Charybdis 
Blake Hudson∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Coastal land loss is an inevitable consequence of the confluence 
of three primary factors: population growth, vanishing wetlands, 
and rising sea levels. Society may either mitigate coastal land loss 
by engaging in human engineering projects that create 
technological solutions or restore natural processes that protect the 
coastal zone, or it may choose to adapt to coastal land loss by 
shifting development and other human and economic resources out 
of areas especially at risk for coastal land loss. This Article first 
details the primary threats to coastal lands. Next, the Article 
discusses two primary means of addressing coastal land loss—
mitigation and adaptation—applying those terms slightly differently 
than they are used in the broader climate change context in order to 
focus more precisely on the coastal land loss phenomena and its 
solutions. Finally, the Article makes three normative claims for why 
policy-makers should approach coastal land loss mitigation in 
particular with caution: (1) uncertainty of mitigation’s effectiveness 
scientifically and institutionally; (2) the political expediency of 
choosing mitigation over adaptation; and (3) the fact that failure to 
adapt past land-use activities in the coastal zone has contributed to 
the need to adapt or mitigate today.  
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE ANCIENT MYTH AND THE MODERN REALITY 
He runs on Scylla, wishing to avoid Charybdis.1 
Erasmus, Adagia 
In Homer’s epic Odyssey, the hero Odysseus faces a tragic 
choice. He must guide his men through a narrow strait and either 
pass close to Charybdis, a sea monster that spewed forth water 
three times per day with disastrous consequence, or pass close to 
Scylla, a monster on the coast with six snake-like heads filled with 
fangs and encircled with the heads of baying dogs around its 
                                                                                                         
 1. The idiom “between Scylla and Charybdis” means “between two 
equally perilous alternatives, neither of which can be passed without 
encountering and probably falling victim to the other.” Scylla Definition, 
DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/scylla (last visited 
Aug. 31, 2012). 
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waist.2 Odysseus ultimately chose the latter fate, accepting the loss 
of some of his men by crashing into the coast, but calculating that 
he would lose far fewer men than if he challenged the raging sea. 
U.S. citizens and policy-makers face a similarly costly 
choice―that of either grappling directly with increasingly 
menacing and encroaching seas or undergoing the societally and 
economically disruptive, but potentially less devastating, transition 
to further inland. As the climate continues to change and sea levels 
continue to rise, the United States will continue to lose coastal land 
due to these “geologic” forces. At the same time, American 
citizens continue to flock to the coastal zone at a rate tracking the 
already high exponential rate of population growth.3 Along with 
that growth comes increased residential, commercial, and 
industrial coastal-zone development and associated infrastructure 
improvements, resulting in what may be described as “artificial” 
coastal land loss, or “runaway land consumption,”4 as land 
continues to be appropriated from its natural state by human 
activity. Though land development has certainly contributed to 
societal, economic, and technological advancement, when land 
development becomes wasteful of valuable ecosystem service and 
other functions provided by natural habitat, then those attributes of 
the land are lost and society is faced with great difficulty (if not 
impossibility) in recreating them. Consider the leveeing and 
diversion of the Mississippi River or the filling in of coastal 
wetlands. As these natural lands became increasingly developed 
and subject to human-made engineering projects, their functional 
provision of buffer from sea-level rise, protection from hurricane 
storm surge and provision of other forms of flood control, water 
filtration services, and habitat protection may certainly be 
considered a form of land loss. 
In later times, Scylla was rationalized as a rocky shoal, an 
inescapable threat upon which those seeking to avoid Charybdis 
would inevitably crash. Indeed, due to population and development 
pressures, the U.S. coastline is becoming increasingly hardened 
                                                                                                         
 2. Scylla and Charybdis, BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www. 
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/530331/Scylla-and-Charybdis (last visited Aug. 
31, 2012).  
 3. KRISTEN M. CROSSETT ET AL., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC 
ADMIN., POPULATION TRENDS ALONG THE COASTAL UNITED STATES: 1980–
2008 1 (2004), available at http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/programs/mb/pdfs/ 
coastal_pop_trends_complete.pdf. 
 4. DANA BEACH, PEW OCEANS COMM’N, COASTAL SPRAWL: THE EFFECTS 
OF URBAN DESIGN ON AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES ii (2002), 
available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/ 
Protecting_ocean_life/env_pew_oceans_sprawl.pdf. 
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like the precipice of Scylla―whether it is the filling of coastal 
wetlands to provide a foundation for agricultural, industrial, or 
residential development; the very concrete structures and paved 
surfaces that comprise coastal development; or the sea walls, dams, 
levees, and other man-made artifices designed to keep the sea at 
bay. This hardening of the coast exacerbates coastal threats to 
human populations, potentially forcing them to make a painful 
choice to run even farther inland to higher ground. Similarly, 
Charybdis was later rationalized as a giant, destructive whirlpool― 
a reconceptualization bearing an almost prophetic semblance to the 
rising seas that now threaten U.S. coasts. 
It is time for the myth of Scylla and Charybdis to be 
reconceptualized once more and in line with the potentially tragic 
modern reality, especially given its accurate metaphor of choosing 
between the perils of the sea and the threats looming on the coast. 
The modern choice regards how we allocate priority on either 
mitigation or adaptation as the primary response to coastal land 
lossassuming, of course, that we do not wish to take the third 
option of doing nothing and allowing our ship to sink. With coastal 
land loss mitigation we have a choice to confront Charybdis in an 
attempt to keep the sea at bay: to design policies and invest billions 
of dollars to restore wetlands; to rebuild coastal lands and barrier 
islands through dredging and other large-scale engineering 
projects; or to create man-made structures such as sea walls and 
other mechanisms of tide and flood control, to name a few 
examples. With coastal land loss adaptation we have a choice to 
“run on Scylla” and endure the hardship of, first, slowing the rapid 
commercial and industrial land development and population boom 
in high risk areas of our coastal zone, and second, making a 
difficult transition from already existing development and 
infrastructure in these areas to higher ground inland.  
Certainly these two options are not mutually exclusive, and as 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has noted, policies 
aimed at both are necessary to manage climate change generally, 
and coastal land loss specifically.5 Yet, the relative emphasis on 
either mitigation or adaptation (as a general matter and given the 
unique needs of particular geographic regions) will have drastic 
ramifications not only for the effectiveness of the coastal land loss 
response, but also for the amount and allocation of local, state, and 
federal financial resources. In other words, though both mitigation 
                                                                                                         
 5. RICHARD J.T. KLEIN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATIONS AND VULNERABILITY 
745 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ 
assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter18.pdf. 
2012] THE MITIGATION–ADAPTATION DILEMMA 35 
 
 
 
and adaptation are likely to be used in different areas along the 
coast, a great risk lies in striking the balance between the two that 
places too much emphasis on one or the other. In particular, though 
coastal land loss mitigation may be the more appealing option in 
the short term, since society may be reticent to accept major 
changes to historical land use and settlement patterns in the coastal 
zone and may have a tendency to believe it can engineer its way 
out of any environmental crisis, mitigation efforts also pose the 
greatest risk if they fail. Though coastal land loss adaptation may 
be more difficult over the short term, it will succeed in moving 
society out of harm’s way regardless of whether projected climate 
change-related threats to the coastal zone come to fruition to the 
degree projected. On the other hand, the change that will take place 
in the coastal zone due to climate change may be too great to 
effectively combat with attempted engineering projects or wetland 
restoration efforts aimed at keeping the sea at bay, potentially 
resulting in years of wasted effort and billions of dollars that would 
have been better utilized to shift societal infrastructure away from 
high-risk areas. 
This Article in no way seeks to provide definitive solutions for 
striking the balance between coastal land loss adaptation and 
mitigation, either regarding how precisely the balance should be 
struck or where along different coastal regions coastal land loss 
adaptation would be preferable to mitigation and vice versa. 
Various regions of the U.S. and around the world face different 
coastal land loss challenges, depending on whether they are 
designated as a delta region, a rocky coast, or some other form of 
geologic intersection of land and sea. Given the complexities of 
choosing and designing coastal land loss mitigation or adaptation 
policies by region, this Article merely seeks to highlight some 
considerations for policy-makers and scientists when making those 
choices and designing coastal land loss policies. The Article does 
so by first, in Part II, describing the confluence of events that have 
given rise to coastal land loss, namely population growth, 
vanishing wetlands, and sea-level rise. Part III then discusses the 
mitigation and adaptation response options for coastal land loss, 
neither of which are optimal, but which are the most viable 
responses to inevitable climate change impacts. Part IV then makes 
a normative claim that we should approach coastal land loss 
mitigation with caution and, like Odysseus, have the courage to 
retreat from the rising tide by choosing adaptation when the long-
term view would demand it in areas particularly vulnerable to 
coastal land loss. This normative claim of caution toward coastal 
land loss mitigation actions is based primarily on three 
considerations: (1) the uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of 
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mitigation actions over the long term; (2) the tempting political 
expediency that may misguidedly drive policy-makers’ choice to 
implement mitigation policies over adaptation; and (3) the fact that 
failure to adapt past land-use activities in the coastal zone has 
contributed to the need to adapt or mitigate today—lending support 
to the premise that adaptation now can avoid both costly mitigation 
policies as well as preempt the need to mitigate or adapt to coastal 
land loss in the future. 
II. THE PERFECT STORM FOR COASTAL LAND LOSS: POPULATION 
GROWTH, VANISHING WETLANDS, AND RISING SEAS 
Three primary phenomena have converged in the coastal zone 
to give rise to coastal land loss. These phenomena are so 
inextricably entwined that discussing them in isolation is difficult. 
Populations have increased in the coastal zone, exacerbating 
“artificial” land loss as commercial, industrial, and residential 
development replace coastal lands, coastal natural capital (such as 
wetlands), and the ecosystem services that those resources provide. 
In turn, rising populations have increased the need to protect 
human-made capital in the coastal zone, which has given rise to 
more dams, levees, sea walls and other structures that have starved 
the coast of sediment, replaced wetlands, and caused subsidence 
that accelerates sea-level rise—compounding “geologic” coastal 
land loss by further accelerating an already increasing rate of sea-
level rise. The following sections briefly discuss these phenomena 
in turn. 
A. Population Growth 
The Low Elevation Coastal Zone (LECZ) is the contiguous 
area along the coast that is less than ten meters above sea level. 
Though this area covers only 2% of the world’s land area, it 
contains 10% of the world’s population and 13% of global urban 
population.6 As a result of high populations in the coastal zone, 
“[b]oth urban disasters and environmental hot spots are already 
located disproportionately in low-lying coastal areas. Climate 
change will increase the risk of both.”7 
                                                                                                         
 6. Gordon McGranahan et al., The Rising Tide: Assessing the Risks of 
Climate Change and Human Settlements in Low Elevation Coastal Zones, 19 
ENV’T & URBANIZATION 17, 17 (2007), available at http://sedac.ciesin.columbia. 
edu/gpw/docs/McGranahan2007.pdf. 
 7. Id. at 18 (citation omitted) (stating further that “[i]n particular, rising sea 
levels will increase the risk of floods, and stronger tropical storms may further 
increase the flood risk”). 
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In 2003, approximately 153 million U.S. citizens, or 53% of 
the population, lived in coastal counties. Ten of the fifteen largest 
U.S. cities are in coastal counties,8 and “23 of the 25 most densely 
populated U.S. counties are coastal.”9 Coastal counties, as a 
general matter, average 300 persons per square mile—far more 
than the national average of 98 persons per square mile.10 As a 
result, over half of the U.S. population lives within the 17% of land 
that is coastal,11 with some states maintaining over half of their 
population in the coastal zone. Louisiana, for example, is one of 
two states bordering the Gulf of Mexico with a majority of its 
population in coastal counties (or, more precisely, “parishes” in 
Louisiana).12  
Not only are absolute population numbers in the coastal zone 
disproportionate to total U.S. population, but so too is the rate of 
population growth. Coastal population increased between 1980 and 
2003 by 33 million,13 accounting for nearly half of the United 
States’ total population growth during that time period.14 Stated 
differently, nearly half of the total U.S. population’s growth 
occurred within 17% of its land, the coastal zone. Coastal 
population is expected to increase by another 27 million by 2017, 
accounting this time for more than half of the country’s total 
population increase.15 The rate of population growth in coastal 
counties outpacing that of the country as a whole creates a 
dramatic increase in population density along the coast, which, 
combined with the fast-growing coastal economy,16 increases the 
rate at which coastal land is lost due to human activities (i.e., 
“artificial” coastal land loss).17  
Permanent settlement, however, is not the only population 
pressure along the coast. The yearly influx of vacationers increases 
coastal stress even further, and “[w]ith more people comes the 
need for increased infrastructure,” which leads to even more 
                                                                                                         
 8. CROSSETT ET AL., supra note 3, at 1. 
 9. Id. at 7. 
 10. Id. Coastal counties also provide a key source of waterborne commerce, 
with seven of the ten leading ports in Gulf states and south Louisiana accounting 
for about 9% of waterborne commerce in principal U.S. ports. Id. at 18. 
 11. Id. at 6. 
 12. Id. at 18 (noting that the other state is Florida). 
 13. Id. at 1. 
 14. See Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census. 
gov/popest/data/historical/index.html (last updated May 22, 2012). 
 15. BEACH, supra note 4, at ii. 
 16. The median household income of coastal counties is approximately 17% 
higher than noncoastal counties. CROSSETT ET AL., supra note 3, at 12. 
 17. Id. at 1. 
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coastal land loss.18 Furthermore, “[i]n the next few decades, coastal 
areas will also see a growing proportion of older Americans and an 
unprecedented number of Americans reaching retirement age.”19 
Each of these factors contributes to a population boom along the 
coast. 
Along with increased population comes a great deal of 
economic wealth and resources. In 2000, coastal counties 
contained 57% of civilian income, and income per square 
kilometer in these counties is more than eight times that of inland 
counties.20 Furthermore, the level and growth rate of per capita 
income is strongly positively correlated with coastal proximity.21 
In 2000, coastal counties maintained per worker annual labor 
income that averaged approximately $41,000 versus approximately 
$31,000 in inland counties.22 In addition, coastal counties maintain 
citizenry that are, on average, more educated than inland counties. 
Nearly 28% of adults in coastal counties in 2000 had at least a 
Bachelor’s degree, compared to 22% of inland adults, while nearly 
11% had a graduate degree, compared to 8% of inland adults.23  
As if exponential population growth in and of itself did not 
stress coastal lands enough, the population growth rate and the 
accumulation of wealth in the coastal zone each reinforce a 
feedback loop whereby development pressures increase at rates 
that actually outpace population growth generally. For example, 
while a great degree of natural capital has been replaced by 
agricultural lands in the coastal zone, coastal counties in the United 
States are losing nearly 2,000 acres of farmland per day to 
urbanization and other development,24 and “[s]ome large coastal 
metropolitan areas are consuming land ten times as fast as they are 
adding new residents.”25 In 1997, the amount of developed coastal 
acreage was 14%, but if current rates of land consumption continue 
unchecked, more than one-quarter of coastal acreage will be 
developed by 2025.26 In fact, “[b]y most measures, human impacts 
to coastal ecosystems have grown faster than the rate of population 
growth. So, although population statistics paint an alarming picture 
                                                                                                         
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Jordan Rappaport & Jeffrey D. Sachs, The United States as a Coastal 
Nation, 8 J. ECON. GROWTH 5, 5 (2003), available at http://mvs.ei.columbia.edu/ 
sitefiles/file/about/director/documents/jeg0304.pdf. 
 21. Id. at 7. 
 22. Id. at 16. 
 23. Id. 
 24. CROSSETT ET AL., supra note 3, at 16. 
 25. BEACH, supra note 4, at ii. 
 26. Id. 
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for coastal management, they actually understate the magnitude of 
the challenge.”27 Developed land in the United States as a whole 
increased by 25 million acres (34%) between 1982 and 1997, 
which “means that more than one-fourth of all of the land 
converted from rural to urban and suburban uses since European 
settlement occurred in only 15 years.”28 Though developed land 
grew by 34%, corresponding population growth was only 15%, 
demonstrating that land consumption occurred at a rate “more than 
twice the underlying rate of population growth [, and] the 
mismatch between land development and population growth is 
widening. Between 1982 and 1992, land was developed at 1.8 
times the rate of population growth. During the period between 
1992 and 1997, that multiple had grown to 2.5.”29 One can imagine 
the result of stacking exponential land consumption on top of 
exponential population growthcoastal land that is being 
appropriated and “lost” at astonishing rates. As described by the 
Pew Oceans Commission: 
Between 2000 and 2025, the U.S. population is projected to 
grow by 22 percent. If the relationship between land use 
and population in the last decade continues, there will be 68 
million more acres of developed land in the contiguous 
U.S. than there are today . . . . This newly developed 
acreage—equivalent to the land area of Wyoming—will 
almost match the amount of land developed from the 
founding of the country until 1983.30 
In other words, “[i]f developed land were expanding at the 
same rate as population, coastal zone management would be a 
formidable task. With development vastly outstripping even the 
relatively high rate of population growth, the challenge is 
considerably greater.”31 Because more than half of this projected 
growth will occur within the coastal zone, the impact will be even 
greater along the coast. In 1982, 10% of coastal watersheds were 
developed, which increased to nearly 14% in 1997, and if trends 
continue, more than 25% of the country’s coastal watersheds will 
be developed by 2025.32 
                                                                                                         
 27. Id. at 2. 
 28. Id. at 4. 
 29. Id. (citations omitted). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 5. 
 32. Id. This can have profound impacts on coastal ecosystem health, because: 
When more than ten percent of the acreage of a watershed is covered in 
roads, parking lots, rooftops, and other impervious surfaces, the rivers 
and streams within the watershed become seriously degraded . . . . By 
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In short, “U.S. economic activity is overwhelmingly 
concentrated near its ocean and Great Lakes coasts,” and this 
concentration is increasing.33 Exponential population growth, 
combined with disproportionate economic growth and wealth 
accumulation in the coastal zone, combined with development 
impacts that increase exponentially and disproportionately with the 
underlying rate of population growth, make any choice between 
land loss mitigation or adaptation policies, and any attempt to 
actually implement them, exceedingly difficult. The investment 
needed to implement mitigation policies will continue to rise. As 
more people need protection from geologic land loss caused by the 
encroaching seas, there is also more wealth to protect in the form 
of residential and commercial development, jobs, and 
infrastructure tied directly to inland economic welfare. 
Furthermore, “artificial” coastal land loss is exacerbated by 
increasingly diminishing natural capital and associated ecosystem 
services.  
As with mitigation, adaptation policies must grapple with the 
fact that there are more people to move out of coastal areas, more 
wealth accumulation and investment to forestall in order to prevent 
development of new areas, and increased economic and social 
inertia that make slowing down coastal zone growth in the first 
instance difficult, much less steering already anchored economic 
and social systems further inland. The irony is that while 
productivity factors have traditionally driven wealth accumulation 
in the coastal zone, quality of life considerations have played an 
increasing rolequality of life that will quickly degrade without 
making the difficult choice to adopt adaptation or mitigation 
measures.34 The rapid reduction of natural capital increasingly 
recognized as crucial to human welfare, particularly the loss of 
coastal wetlands, is compounding the reduction in quality of life 
along the coastal zone. 
 
 
                                                                                                         
 
virtually every measure of ecosystem health, the streams, creeks, 
marshes, and rivers surrounded by hardened watersheds are less diverse, 
less stable, and less productive than those in natural watersheds. If the 
percentage of the coast that is developed rises sharply (from 14 percent to 
25 percent) over the next 25 years, these studies point to an irreversible 
decline in coastal aquatic ecosystem health. 
Id. at 7. 
 33. Rappaport & Sachs, supra note 20, at 7. 
 34. Id. 
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B. Vanishing Wetlands 
Over the last century, development has claimed over half of all 
wetlands in North America.35 The loss of important ecosystem 
services provided by wetlands can “make urban settlements more 
prone to disaster, amplifying the risks of climate change.”36 
Wetlands provide a wide variety of ecosystem services important 
to both human well-being and the maintenance of coastal land—
not only the physical maintenance of coastal land, but also the 
maintenance of its functionality. Wetlands provide a variety of 
services. Wetlands act as a key buffer system that protects against 
storm surge caused by hurricanes and other weather events; 
dissipate and absorb flood waters and stormwater runoff—thus 
protecting local communities and saving municipalities flood 
control expenditures; act as an anchor for preserving coastal lands 
by dispersing coast-building sediment and forestalling coastal 
erosion; provide water filtration services that clean coastal waters; 
act as a major carbon sink that helps regulate the climate; and 
provide habitat for coastal species, among a variety of other 
services.  
Vanishing wetlands are directly tied to rising sea levels as well 
as increasing populations and associated development. As 
described by scholars:  
Water drains more rapidly from built-over land, increasing 
peak flows and flood risks . . . . In many parts of the world, 
developers have drained wetlands . . . removing a buffer 
against tidal floods. Particularly in delta regions, land 
compaction, subsidence due to groundwater withdrawal 
and reductions in the rate of sediment deposition (due to 
water regulation) can lead, in effect, to sea-level rise, 
increasing flood risk (as well as creating various other 
problems).37 
In some U.S. states—Louisiana, for example—the 
disappearance of wetlands has indeed compounded coastal land 
loss and has further synergized with rising sea levels to exacerbate 
disaster events that have become seared into the collective national 
                                                                                                         
 35. David Moreno-Mateos et al., Structural and Functional Loss in 
Restored Wetland Ecosystems, 10 PLOS BIOLOGY 1, 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.10
01247 (follow “PDF” hyperlink). 
 36. McGranahan et al., supra note 6, at 18. Other resources, such as coastal 
forests and coral reefs, are similarly imperiled. Roughly one-third of coastal 
mangrove forests and one-fifth of coral reefs have disappeared. Id. at 19. 
 37. Id. at 19. 
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consciousness—Hurricane Katrina being a recent example, causing 
by some estimates $108 billion in damages.38 The loss of wetlands 
has had particular implications for gulf hurricanes and resulting 
severe-flood events, leading to ever-increasing economic and 
human costs. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that low-lying 
coastal lands, for instance, “are already vulnerable to erosion, 
flooding, storm surges, and tsunamis; and poor development 
planning has placed trillions of dollars’ worth of building and 
infrastructure directly in the path of these threats.”39  
Coastal Louisiana is a complex ecosystem created by 7,000 
years of sediment deposition from the Mississippi River.40 Even 
so, Louisiana is losing 6,600 acres of coastal wetlands per year.41 
Some of this loss is naturally occurring, but “the real culprits are 
human-made”42 and include commercial and residential 
development, levees, navigational channels, and oil-and-gas 
infrastructure. The overland flow of storm surge can be stifled by 
healthy marshes and cypress swamps, and natural waterways 
facilitate sediment and nutrient exchange. In contrast, storm surge 
is uninhibited when flowing through deep man-made navigation 
channels, which in turn results in the need to construct and 
maintain even more man-made flood control devices.43 In addition 
to inhibiting sediment and nutrient exchange with the landscape, 
navigation channels further provide a pathway for salt water to 
move inland and destroy inland cypress swamps and freshwater 
marshes.44  
Conversion of natural wetlands to pastures, agricultural lands, 
and cities has resulted in the need for higher levees and larger 
pumps for flood protection and has further eliminated the natural 
process of soil accretion, which, when combined with sea-level 
rise and increased subsidence, causes the landscape to eventually 
                                                                                                         
 38. RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLE 
REPORT: HURRICANE KATRINA 13 (2005), available at http://www.nhc.noaa. 
gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf. 
 39. Christophe A.G. Tulou et al., Climate Change and the Marine 
Environment, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 571, 578 (Donald C. 
Baur, Tim Eichenberg & Michael Sutton eds., 2008). 
 40. COASTAL LA. ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT & RESTORATION, REDUCING 
FLOOD DAMAGE IN COASTAL LOUISIANA: COMMUNITIES, CULTURE & 
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sink below the water level.45 Prior to levee construction, natural 
flooding from rivers and bays provided the important function of 
adding sediment and organic matter through the process of 
accretion, which allows land elevation to remain stable in the face 
of sea-level rise and soil subsidence.46 Levees disrupt the delivery 
of these sediments, and removing water from the soil increases 
subsidence, reduces accretion, and requires ever increasing levee 
height and pump capacity as “land continues to sink [and] the sea 
level rises.”47  
Ultimately, human development activities in coastal Louisiana 
have “accelerate[d] coastal land loss by reducing the natural flow 
of the [Mississippi] [R]iver’s freshwater and sediment to wetland 
areas, where the lost land would then naturally be replenished.”48 
Instead of maintaining and replenishing wetlands, the sediment 
empties into the Gulf as far as the outer continental shelf where it 
cannot form important barrier islands.49 As these barrier islands 
erode, storm surges and wave impacts threaten commercial 
infrastructure farther and farther inland, again leading to the need 
to build more levees, larger levees, and more robust pumping 
systems.50 So, it is not only commercial and residential coastal 
development that cause disaster related to wetland loss, but also 
the very human-made structures meant to prevent coastal land loss 
and associated disasters in the first instance. As scholars have 
described: “Unintended consequences of flood protection measures 
[and] individual public work projects have increased risks to 
natural resources [and] human settlements resulting in a more 
dangerous place to live [and] work.”51 Indeed, had more natural 
wetlands been maintained along coastal Louisiana, they could have 
prevented much of Katrina’s storm surge damage. Other coastal 
states face a similarly staggering amount of wetland loss. For 
example, in only the last 15 years, 84,000 acres of wetlands have 
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been converted to urban development in Florida—a rate of 5,600 
acres per year.52  
Despite the increasing rate of destruction of coastal wetlands, 
state and federal governments have largely failed to formulate a 
plan for curbing their destruction, restoring them, or designing 
policies to encourage a shift in development activities to farther 
inland. After Hurricane Georges barely missed New Orleans in 
1998, a $14 billion wetlands restoration plan was formulated, but 
Congress and the Bush administration did not act on the 
proposal.53 Following another near miss from Hurricane Ivan, one 
Louisiana administrator observed, “What is it going to take for 
Congress and the president to realize this is not just another 
project? . . . Would we have had to get hit by the big one? Who 
wants to wait for that? Surely it shouldn’t have to take loss of life, 
[should] it?”54 Only one year later, Hurricane Katrina killed at least 
1,800 people and cost over $108 billion in damages.55 As discussed 
below, it is unclear whether wetlands restoration is a surefire, long-
term answer to addressing coastal land loss, and it seems clear that 
a history of poor development planning contributed to Katrina’s 
human and economic costs. Even so, some might argue that the 
$14 billion wetlands restoration cost is a bargain compared to the 
$108 billion in damages wrought by Katrina. The economic costs 
of not curbing destruction of existing wetlands, guiding current and 
future development away from rapidly eroding coastal lands and 
rising sea levels, or restoring wetlands will only increase, since 
hurricanes are expected to become both more frequent and more 
intense as climate change contributes to warmer oceans.56 
Ultimately, vanishing wetlands synergize with rising populations 
and rising sea levels to compound coastal land loss. 
C. Rising Seas 
Rising sea level is perhaps the most obvious threat to coastal 
lands—it is the Charybdis from which we must either flee by 
adapting or fight by mitigating to the extent possible. Indeed, as 
Odysseus perceived regarding the dangers of Charybdis, scholars 
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have argued that climate change, the source of more rapid sea-level 
rise in the recent past and in the future, is nothing more than “a 
slow-moving disaster.”57 Unlike most disasters, however, the 
harmful land loss threats of sea-level rise are not immediately 
obvious, because its observable impacts play out incrementally 
over human lifetimes. This makes sea-level rise arguably even 
more dangerous than other threats to coastal lands, at least in the 
sense of spurring human action. The full magnitude of harm is 
apparent only when temporally aggregated over periods of time 
exceeding any one generation’s lifespan. Thus, forging collective 
action among individuals, policy-makers, and governments to 
avoid the disaster is especially difficult. As Professor Buzbee 
described: “A sudden disaster or perceived crisis is often essential 
to rouse the populace and give politicians reasons to take on issues 
of harms caused by industry and the process of real estate 
development.”58 While sea-level rise may exacerbate sudden 
disaster events like floods, it is otherwise by definition not 
“sudden,” thus masking the perceived crisis.  
Though sea level rose .17 meters over the past century, a rate of 
roughly 1.7 mm/year,59 satellite imagery demonstrates that the rate 
increased to 3.1 mm/year between 1993 and 2003.60 In other words, 
the rate of sea-level rise is accelerating. Because this increased rate 
corresponds with increases in atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases and temperatures over the same time period, the 
future impact of a changing climate on sea levels is highly variable 
and uncertain. A recent report found that “[p]rojections of sea-level 
rise for the twenty-first century vary widely, ranging from several 
centimeters to more than a meter.”61 Even so, these estimates may 
be revised upward given the continued rise in global temperatures 
and the rapid loss of arctic and Antarctic ice sheets.62 Ultimately, 
“warming and sea level rise will continue for more than a 
millennium, even if carbon dioxide concentrations are stabilized, 
due to the long time required to remove this gas from the 
atmosphere.”63 This dire warning has critical implications for 
coastal land loss, because “rising sea levels . . . will ensure increased 
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damage along increasingly developed shorelines”64 as rising seas 
“inundate low areas and increase flooding, coastal erosion, wetland 
loss, and saltwater intrusion into estuaries and freshwater 
aquifers.”65 Furthermore, rising “sea levels interact with tides and 
storms to create more destructive impacts, as extreme high water 
levels occur with more frequency.”66  
Approximately 58,000 square kilometers of coastline along the 
Atlantic seaboard and Gulf of Mexico are less than 1.5 meters 
above sea level, with more than 80% of this coastline in Louisiana, 
Florida, Texas, and North Carolina. North Carolina alone 
maintains as much land within one meter of sea level as the 
Netherlands.67 Indeed, “Atlantic and Gulf Coast shorelines are 
especially vulnerable to long term sea-level rise . . . . [T]he slope 
of these areas is so gentle that a small rise in sea level produces a 
large inland shift of the shoreline.”68 Approximately 1,600 square 
kilometers of land in 85 eastern seaboard counties lie less than a 
meter above current sea levels, potentially threatening 
approximately 4,800 kilometers of roads and 388,000 people.69 
Over the next 50 years, coastal erosion is estimated to threaten 
nearly 87,000 homes along U.S. coasts.70  
In the City of Boston, sea levels could rise up to a meter over 
the next 100 years, and even best-case estimates of sea-level rise 
and climate change could leave “Massachusetts General Hospital, 
the Public Garden, the Esplanade, and MIT in a pool of water after 
a strong storm surge in the harbor.”71 Flood damage in Boston 
would be around $57 billion over the next 100 years, $26 billion 
more than would occur without sea-level rise impacts.72 On the 
other side of the country in California, a mere .3 meter rise in sea 
level would cause what were once 100-year storm surge flood 
events to become ten-year events.73 Similarly, in San Diego, a no-
sea-level-rise scenario would result in approximately ten extreme 
weather events between 2070–2100, but “[o]ver the same time 
period there would be approximately 330 extreme events with a 
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rise in sea level of twenty centimeters, 2,300 extreme events with a 
rise of forty centimeters, and almost 19,000 events with a rise of 
eighty centimeters.”74  
These brief examples merely demonstrate that mitigation and 
adaptation policies aimed at coastal land loss and associated 
disasters must inevitably grapple with the consequences of sea-
level rise because: 
Sea levels rising at exponential rates (over geologic time 
scales) will meet head-on with a rush of humans heading at 
exponential rates right into the face of the disaster—an 
ironic scenario that demonstrates the circular nature of 
human psychology related to disasters. Humans exacerbate 
climate change through carbon emissions, and as a result 
sea levels rise; then humans move in disproportionate 
numbers into areas likely to be inundated by rising sea 
levels; then society expects a system of disaster law and 
policy to alleviate their difficulties after disaster strikes.75  
Despite the negative land-use policy impacts caused by this 
type of collective psychological inertia, governments are beginning 
the process of preparing for rising seas. The Coastal Protection and 
Restoration Authority of Louisiana (CPRA), for example, issued a 
recent report finding that “Louisiana is particularly sensitive to 
sea-level rise due to the unique geology of the State’s Delta and 
Chenier Plains” and that the State must “integrate up-to-date sea-
level rise data into planning and engineering activities to anticipate 
coastal land loss patterns, protect coastal communities and 
adequately design restoration projects.”76 Rising sea levels in 
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Louisiana are “exposing lowland areas to more frequent events of 
saltwater intrusion, flooding, and rapid shoreline erosion, 
magnifying the negative effects of coastal storms and storm 
surge.”77 These effects are especially acute in Louisiana because it 
has some of the world’s highest rates of soil subsidence, given the 
historically dynamic nature of the Mississippi Delta that makes up 
the eastern two-thirds of the state’s coastline.78 Furthermore, not 
only is sea-level rise accelerating globally across the board, but in 
Louisiana some areas are experiencing rates up to 58% greater than 
other areas, demonstrating the regional variability with which sea 
level can rise.79 The CPRA technical report recommended the 
assumption of a Gulf sea-level rise of one meter by 2100, or, the 
high end of the projections noted at the beginning of this section.  
Ultimately, while populations rapidly rise and coastal wetlands 
and other ecosystem services are rapidly lost to human 
development, sea levels will slowly continue to rise. Yet, despite 
sea-level rise’s methodical nature—and indeed perhaps because of 
it—it will have potentially the most profound interjurisdictional 
and nationwide impacts. These impacts will synergize with other 
disasters like hurricanes and flood events to wreak havoc on the 
human-built coastal environment and the ever-increasing 
populations that live in coastal areas—especially in the absence of 
innovative and responsible coastal land loss mitigation and 
adaptation responses.  
III. CAUGHT IN A DOUBLE BIND: THE MITIGATION–ADAPTATION 
DILEMMA 
[W]e understand that trying to maintain the status quo is not only 
futile, it is a recipe for disaster.80 
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Given that population growth, vanishing wetlands, and sea-
level rise are causing coastal land loss at an alarming rate, 
mitigation or adaptation measures will be an inevitable reality in 
coastal zones of the future—whether through proactive policy-
making or by force of nature if society is ultimately driven from 
encroaching seas. Indeed, coastal governments are realizing that 
“[r]educing the risk of disasters related to climate change in coastal 
settlements will require a combination of mitigation, migration[,] 
and settlement modification,”81 the latter two approaches of which 
might be characterized simply as “adaptation.” 
Before proceeding with a discussion of these two measures, a 
point of clarification should be made. This Article uses the terms 
mitigation and adaptation in a slightly different manner than they 
are used in the climate change context generally. Coastal land loss 
mitigation, as used herein, includes actions that seek to forestall or 
mitigate land loss through wetland restoration, river diversion to 
renourish coastlands and restore the natural accretion of land, 
barrier island restoration, dam and levee building, and so on. Each 
of these actions is typically considered “adaptation” in the climate 
change context generally, with scholars and policy-makers 
accepting that climate-change impacts will occur and pursuing 
mechanisms for adapting to those changes. In addition, this use of 
mitigation is divergent from general understandings of climate 
change mitigation, where scholars and policy-makers focus on 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and atmospheric concentrations 
to halt or reverse anthropogenic global warming. Coastal land loss 
adaptation, as used in this Article, means accepting that certain 
coastal lands will be lost to subsidence or rising sea levels, 
pursuing adaptation policies by moving out of areas likely to be 
lost, and otherwise adjusting land-use planning to avoid new 
development in those areas projected to be inundated. Adjustment 
in the use of these terms, and divergence from how they are used in 
the climate change context more generally, allows for more precise 
focus on the coastal land loss phenomenon and its solutions. Both 
coastal land loss mitigation and adaptation are briefly described in 
this section. 
A. Mitigation: Facing Charybdis, a Louisiana Case Study 
Addressing land-use activities associated with the broader issue 
of climate change mitigation might include policies aimed at, for 
example, fostering urban design that builds settlements more 
compactly in order to reduce carbon emissions from transportation 
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and other local activities.82 Mitigation of coastal land loss 
specifically, on the other hand, would entail a variety of projects 
aimed at building coastal land and keeping the sea at bay. A recent 
example of coastal land loss mitigation policy is the State of 
Louisiana’s Comprehensive Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast 
(Master Plan). The Master Plan is aimed at investing $50 billion 
over upcoming decades to restore the Louisiana coast and at 
mitigating coastal land loss by fighting the encroaching sea—
metaphorically taking on Charybdis with full force. After 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita pummeled the Louisiana coast, the 
Louisiana Legislature created the Coastal Protection and 
Restoration Authority of Louisiana (CPRA), referenced above, 
which was “required [to] develop a plan for a safe and sustainable 
coast.”83 The Master Plan resulted from CPRA’s efforts and is 
intended to establish a strategy for protecting a state whose 
importance to the U.S.’s natural resources and economy cannot be 
overstated. 
In 2006, Louisiana alone accounted for 27% of the country’s 
crude oil, 15% of its natural gas, 30% of commercial fisheries, and 
21% of waterborne commerce, with coastal Louisiana maintaining 
the country’s largest port complex.84 This coastal ecosystem 
protects 90% of the country’s outer continental shelf oil and gas 
and 26% of the commercial fisheries landings in the United 
States.85 Yet, since the 1930s, Louisiana has lost over 1.2 million 
acres of coastal land, and over the next 50 years Louisiana may 
lose another 1.1 million acres, threatening not only the two million 
people who live in south Louisiana and a variety of resources 
crucial to Louisiana’s well-being, but also the well-being of the 
country.86 For example, the Hackberry salt domes house one of just 
four Strategic Petroleum Reserves in the country, potentially 
holding 228 million barrels of crude oil, while Louisiana Highway 
1 connects the nation to Port Fourchon, which supplies 18% of the 
country’s oil. The loss of the highway could potentially cost the 
country over $7 billion.87 Each of these areas is increasingly 
threatened by “[c]oastal land loss [that] has placed these economic 
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and natural resources at increased risk of loss due to the intense 
effects of waves and storm surges from hurricanes.”88 Expected 
annual flood damages over the next 50 years could increase by a 
magnitude of ten, averaging up to a coast-wide average of as much 
as $23 billion per year.89 Even commercial fishing has been 
negatively impacted by coastal land loss. Though likely due to a 
confluence of factors, it is worth noting that the total number of 
Louisiana commercial fishing licenses has declined proportionally 
with the loss of coastal land over the last 25 years, dropping from 
nearly 30,000 in 1987 to a little over 10,000 in 2010.90 This 
corresponds with the loss of nearly half a million acres of coastal 
land over the same time period.91 
The Master Plan aims to halt coastal land loss, to protect these 
resources, and to restore coastal lands by utilizing complex 
modeling that accounts for a variety of coastal land loss factors and 
risks, including sea-level rise, subsidence, storm intensity and 
frequency, river discharge and sediment load, marsh collapse, and 
potential levee and floodwall failure.92 Most mitigation measures 
within the Plan are matters of human engineering aimed at either 
creating manmade structures to manage land loss or restoring 
natural processes to do so. These include projects aimed at 
protective levee building, bank stabilization, barrier island 
restoration, channel realignment, hydrologic restoration, marsh 
creation, bioengineered oyster barrier reef creation, ridge 
restoration, shoreline protection projects, and sediment diversion93 
(using up to 50% of the Mississippi River’s peak flow).94 These 
measures will involve the construction of numerous types of 
structures, such as earthen levees, concrete walls, and floodgates, 
as well as increased pump use,95 and would, for instance, allow 
gates to divert sediment and freshwater through currently 
impenetrable levees to feed and replenish marshy terrain, 
theoretically mimicking the natural flood events of the river before 
the levees were put into place. The 25 land-building restoration 
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projects that the plan projects to be most successful are comprised 
of three primary types: channel realignment, marsh creation, and 
sediment diversion projects.96 Nonstructural projects, on the other 
hand, involve flood-proofing residential and commercial 
properties, increasing the elevation of residential properties, and 
voluntary acquisition of residential properties97—leaving 
ambitious structural engineering projects as the plan’s primary 
focus. Interestingly, the draft Master Plan asserted that only 3% of 
the nonstructural projects suggested would involve voluntary 
acquisition,98 but the final Master Plan is noncommittal regarding 
the role of voluntary acquisitions.99 
The financial expenditures projected to implement the plan are 
equally ambitious, including an approximately $24 billion 
investment in sediment diversion and marsh creation, $10 billion 
for structural protections, $10 billion for nonstructural protections, 
$2 billion for barrier island creation, $1 billion for hydrologic 
restoration, and $3 billion for miscellaneous restoration projects, 
bringing the total budget to around $50 billion.100 The plan justifies 
these expenditures by finding, for instance, that an investment of 
$25 billion in increased flood protection could prevent $100 billion 
to $220 billion in direct asset damage to individuals, communities, 
and industry over the next 50 years.101 The Master Plan actually 
projects that if the state takes the recommended actions, then by 
2042 Louisiana will begin to gain land annually for the first time 
since the 1930s.102 
Ultimately, mitigation measures like those outlined in the 
Louisiana Master Plan may have the potential to undo some of the 
past human contributions to coastal land loss while also harnessing 
human ingenuity to both forestall further land losses and actually 
build land over time. Yet, these measures do not come without 
associated risk and uncertainty, in the form of complex and 
speculative scientific, economic, and, as discussed below, legal and 
political projections. Coastal land loss adaptation, on the other 
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hand, while being more certain in approach and outcome (i.e., if 
people move away from the coast, they will most certainly avoid 
inevitable land losses), carries with it its own difficulties—
primarily, that of forging the political will and societal fortitude to 
make the harder choice over shorter time frames to adapt by 
retreating from harm’s way. 
B. Adaptation: Running on Scylla 
As noted earlier, adaptation to climate change in the general 
sense “seeks to adjust the built and social environment to minimize 
the negative outcomes of now-unavoidable climate change”103 and 
might very well include some of the coastal land loss mitigation 
measures described above. Coastal land loss adaptation, on the 
other hand, involves shifts in population patterns that give rise to 
fundamental changes in existing and future infrastructure, the 
protection of riverine and coastal floodplains and wetlands from 
development, and increased preservation of ecosystems to act as 
species corridors and other natural capital reservoirs as coastal 
ecosystems are lost to sea-level rise104—it means running on 
Scylla, the rocky shoal, farther inland. So in the face of “natural” 
coastal land loss via sea-level rise, land loss adaptation means 
reigning in “artificial” land loss to human development even 
further, in order to remove the populace from lands likely to be lost 
and provide more natural land to act as a buffer between rising seas 
and human habitation that has moved farther inland. These 
adaptation measures “require significant land to undertake, often 
through the provision of open space used for . . . stormwater 
management, sea level rise planning, or for migration corridors”105 
and may require “a dramatic reduction in available areas for new 
development and redevelopment” within existing communities.106 
These types of actions would occur by the establishment of “policy 
framework[s] for re-situating land uses that may become unsafe or 
unsuitable in the future due to climate change,” by “[i]dentify[ing] 
and reserv[ing] locations for relocation of major infrastructure,”107 
and by “[a]ctively plan[ning] ahead for settlement reorientation or 
design.”108  
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Obviously, there are “difficulties inherent in shifting the 
direction of population movements and adapting to increasing 
risk,” and “[m]igration away from lowest elevation coastal zones 
will be important, but can also be costly and difficult to implement 
without causing severe disruptions. Modification of the prevailing 
forms of coastal settlement, so as to protect local residents, will 
also be needed.”109 Indeed, scholars note that “[t]he risks to human 
settlements could be reduced if people and enterprises could be 
encouraged to move away from the coast, or at least from the most 
risk-prone coastal locations.”110 Even so, “current population 
movements are in the opposite direction[,] [and] [g]iven the 
character of urban development, and that the factors driving 
coastward movement are still poorly understood, turning these 
flows around is likely to be slow, costly or both.”111 Nonetheless, 
preventative action regarding the placement of new settlements in 
areas either likely to be lost or that will be needed in the future as a 
buffer for settlement farther inland is a much cheaper and more 
practical approach to adapting to coastal land loss.112 In other 
words, though shifting current development and infrastructure will 
undoubtedly be difficult, an approach that can be more easily 
controlled is deterring the populace’s continued flock to the coast 
and continued development of previously undeveloped lands on 
the coast. 
As scholars have noted, because so much coastal land has 
already been developed, “most of the easier options for shifting 
settlement patterns, and modifying them so that they are better 
adapted to the risks of climate change, will have been foreclosed.”113 
As a result, any option that remains is difficult to choose. Scholars 
have argued that “[p]redicted weather-related events like sea level 
rise, increased storm events, and extreme heat waves imply an 
urgent need for new approaches to settlement design to enable 
human and non-human species to adapt to these increased risks.”114 
Unfortunately, not enough attention has been paid to mechanisms 
for adapting settlement to the land-use related impacts of climate 
change, with most focus being on mitigating impacts. This is almost 
certainly because modern society has yet to face an environmental 
problem on a scale that it has been unable to address or combat with 
the right legal and policy tools; or, rather, on a scale that has 
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foreclosed the ability to “mitigate” in some way. Indeed, “[i]n some 
cases mitigation and adaptation are complementary[,] but in other 
cases these policy goals may conflict.”115 Such is often the case 
when choosing between: (1) not developing coastal land at all or 
moving society out of those areas, and (2) building human-made 
structures or attempting to restore natural processes through human 
engineering. 
In the end, adaptation provides a recipe arguably more simple 
than mitigation for addressing coastal land loss, though one that is 
just as difficult (and in the short term, likely more difficult) than 
mitigation to implement—creating policies aimed at steering new 
and existing development away from areas likely to be lost, and then 
as areas become lost or increasingly under threat of loss, retreating 
to higher ground. This has the potential, over the long term, to be far 
less risky and less costly than investing billions in mitigating land 
loss in areas likely to become inundated regardless of mitigation 
efforts. And indeed, mitigation policy-makers acknowledge that a 
balance of mitigation and adaptation approaches is necessary. 
Louisiana’s Master Plan, for example, implicitly contemplates, 
through the omission of protection measures for various areas of the 
Louisiana coast, that some areas simply cannot be saved, and 
retreating from those areas while investing in mitigation efforts 
elsewhere would be wiser. The risk lies in striking the appropriate 
balance between mitigation and adaptation. The next Part discusses 
three reasons why, like Odysseus, policy-makers should consider 
avoiding Charybdis and running on Scylla under circumstances 
where the short-term lure of mitigation may be appealing but over 
the longer view would be likely to fail—thus tipping the balance in 
favor of adaptation in those areas.  
IV. CHOOSING TO RUN ON SCYLLA: ADAPTING TO THE RISING TIDE 
AND APPROACHING MITIGATION WITH CAUTION 
Change is upon us. We can either embrace it or become victims of 
the challenges we face.116 
A. Uncertainty of Mitigation’s EffectivenessScientifically and 
Institutionally 
There are two primary forms of uncertainty regarding coastal 
land loss mitigation, each of which should cause us to approach 
mitigation with caution. The first is scientific uncertainty regarding 
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the efficacy of wetland restoration, sediment diversion, and other 
human engineering efforts to restore “natural” processes, as well as 
modeling projections of sea-level rise and coastal land subsidence. 
The Louisiana Master Plan, for example, highlights the need to 
maintain realistic and “clear expectations” for mitigation efforts, 
stating that “we cannot recreate the coast of the 20th Century. 
Instead, we must seek to fashion a new landscape that will support 
viable natural and human communities into the future.”117 Along 
with those expectations comes recognition of the profound 
uncertainties of projecting the viability of mitigation projects:  
Although our protection and restoration efforts must be 
based on sound and robust science, we must also 
acknowledge that substantial uncertainties remain . . . . For 
example, we do not know with certainty the rate of sea 
level rise we can expect over the life of a restoration 
project, nor can we fully predict all ecological responses to 
actions such as sediment diversions.118 
Take wetland restoration, for instance. In North America alone 
within the last 20 years, more than $70 billion has been spent 
restoring over seven million acres of wetlands.119 Though wetlands 
restoration has become a “booming business,”120 some scientists 
have argued that restoring wetlands often “fall[s] short of returning 
wetlands to their former biological complexity and functioning.”121 
These scientists have found that “current restoration practice fails 
to recover original levels of wetland ecosystem functions, even 
after many decades. If restoration as currently practiced is used to 
justify further degradation, global loss of wetland ecosystem 
function and structure will spread.”122 More directly, scientists 
assert that “current restoration practice and wetland mitigation 
policies will maintain and likely accelerate the global loss of 
wetland ecosystem functions,”123 and that 
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[i]f we keep degrading or destroying wetlands, for example 
through the use of mitigation banks, it is going to take 
centuries to recover the carbon we are losing. . . . [P]reserve 
the wetland, don’t degrade the wetland. . . . [C]urrent 
thinking holds that many ecosystems just reach an 
alternative state that is different, and you never will recover 
the original.124 
Much of the uncertainty around wetland restoration involves 
further uncertainties surrounding the primary synergistic 
relationship that is crucial to restoring wetlands in a delta system 
like that of the Mississippi—namely, the synergy between 
sediment diversion, subsidence, and sea-level rise. As noted 
earlier, levees and dams along the Mississippi River have caused 
sediment that once renourished and built land over time to be 
channeled and conveyed beyond the outer continental shelf where 
it cannot build land. This has led to subsidence, which combines 
with sea-level rise to amplify coastal land loss. The first layer of 
uncertainty regards rates of subsidence. As CPRA observed: 
“Subsidence is a significant driver of relative sea-level rise in . . . 
Louisiana . . . . While rates of subsidence are highly variable across 
the Louisiana coastal zone, our understanding of the exact rates of 
subsidence at the local level is very limited.”125 In addition, a 
second layer of uncertainty regards sea-level rise—Louisiana 
officials have noted that “there has been very little work done to 
predict the specific change in the Gulf of Mexico water surface for 
the rest of this century” and that without such study, “anticipated 
sea-level changes in the Gulf of Mexico must be primarily 
extrapolated from satellite altimetry or tide gauges, which can be 
less reliable due to the limited period of record.”126 As a result, any 
sediment diversion and wetland restoration projects aimed at 
combating subsidence and sea-level rise is fraught with 
compounded uncertainties. Indeed, opponents to coastal wetland 
restoration, like that outlined in the Louisiana Master Plan, claim 
that experimental sediment diversions that have been in place for at 
least a decade have failed to rebuild land and combat subsidence, 
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and while scientists have shown improvements in those areas, land 
has not rebuilt at rates initially predicted.127  
Importantly, though “restoring wetlands remains a 
controversial strategy,”128 the largest portion of money designated 
by the Louisiana Master Plan—nearly $20 billion—is authorized 
for coastal wetland restoration.129 Policy-makers should seriously 
consider foregoing costly, short-term (geologically speaking) 
restoration expenditures under circumstances in which the return 
on investment is highly uncertain. Obviously, some projects may 
be more efficacious than others, but it remains that while 
mitigation via restoration may be appealing to the collective 
societal psychology of believing that we can engineer our way out 
of any environmental challenge, it may not be as realistic or 
effective over the long term as adapting land-use patterns to retreat 
from rising seas. In other words, we should avoid saddling the 
taxpayer of today with costs of mitigation projects that are likely to 
fail and therefore saddle future generations with continued 
disappearance of coastal lands. 
The second form of coastal land loss mitigation uncertainty is 
institutional and includes both political and legal considerations. 
One of the difficulties in designing policies aimed at both coastal 
land loss mitigation and adaptation is achieving the appropriate 
level of input at each level of government. While politics can 
complicate policy design on one hand, principles of constitutional 
law further compound the issue on the other. The federal 
government currently maintains no regulatory inputs into a variety 
of land-use activities that have critical implications for coastal land 
lossprimarily regarding direct land-use planning that determines 
both the intensity and extent of coastal development.130 This 
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situation is largely due to the institutional inertia of jurisprudence 
declaring that land-use regulation is the “quintessential state and 
local power” under the Constitution.131 Even though state and local 
governments maintain this quintessential role, they are doing little 
to curb coastal land loss and the destruction of coastal ecosystem 
services from human development activities, and indeed their 
interests in promoting economic growth in their respective 
jurisdictions run counter to preserving coastal lands or forestalling 
coastal development today to combat coastal land loss in the 
future. Consider a contrast between Louisiana and North Carolina. 
While Louisiana has developed a plan to prepare for sea-level rise, 
and has projected a one-meter rise in sea levels by the end of the 
century, the North Carolina State Legislature has passed a 
statute132 that caps sea-level rise projections at eight inches, 
forbidding sea-level rise modeling that accounts for climate change 
and instead basing the projection on only linear data from the 
past—an outright rejection of their own state-appointed board of 
scientists who projected a one-meter rise.133 This has led some 
                                                                                                         
 
Brandee Ketchum, Note, Like the Swamp Thing: Something Ambiguous Rises 
From the Hidden Depths of Murky Waters—The Supreme Court’s Treatment of 
Murky Wet Land in Rapanos v. United States, 68 LA. L. REV. 983, 1011–12 
(2008) (footnotes omitted). Additionally, the EPA only exercised its power to 
veto Corps wetland permit issuance eleven times between 1972 and 2007. 
CRAIG PITTMAN & MATTHEW WAITE, PAVING PARADISE: FLORIDA’S VANISHING 
WETLANDS AND THE FAILURE OF NO NET LOSS 167 (2009). 
 131. State governments regulate land use under their authority to exercise the 
“police power” for protection of the “general welfare.” See generally Mugler v. 
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Scholars have recognized that “[t]he weight of 
legal and political opinion holds that this allocation of power in [the U.S.] leaves 
the states in charge of regulating how private land is used,” JOHN R. NOLON, 
PATRICIA E. SALKIN & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE AND COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT 17 (7th ed. 2008), and that “[l]and use law has always been a 
creature of state and local law,” Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public 
Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 335 (2003). The U.S. Supreme Court has further 
recognized that “[r]egulation of land use . . . is a quintessential state and local 
power.” Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006). See also Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Miss., 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982) 
(“[R]egulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential state activity.” (emphasis 
added)). It is true that the Coastal Zone Management Act allows some level of 
federal influence on coasts. It remains, however, a very weak approach and is a 
voluntary program (to avoid federalism concerns) without significant 
prescriptive dictates. See Hudson, supra note 75, at 2034, 2052–54. 
 132. Act of July 3, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 202. 
 133. Wade Rawlins, North Carolina Lawmakers Reject Sea Level Rise 
Predictions, REUTERS (July 12, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/ 
07/03/us-usa-northcarolina-idUSBRE86217I20120703. See also Scott Huler, NC 
60 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
 
 
commentators to declare that North Carolina has considered 
“making sea level rise illegal.”134 Furthermore, it is not only states 
that politically and legally make a successful, coordinated land loss 
response uncertain. The federal government is complicit in 
facilitating human settlement patterns within the coastal zone, as 
its National Flood Insurance Program subsidizes poor development 
in areas at risk for coastal land loss.135 
Absent coordination, either among state and local governments 
or provided by a higher-level authority, such as the federal 
government, governments around the country may very well 
continue to ignore the artificial and natural threats to coastal lands, 
especially because they have incentives to grow their individual 
economies, to increase the tax base by attracting more residents, 
and to create job opportunities in order to maintain and continue to 
grow the population and the economy. At the very least, even if 
governments formulate plans, they may tip the scale toward 
mitigation over adaptation when long-term prudence would call for 
the opposite result. Ultimately, the collective inaction or 
miscalculations of the federal government and the disparate and 
numerous subnational governments damages the shared coastal 
land resource.136  
While horizontal coordination uncertainties exist regarding 
political and legal actions across different levels of government, 
such as the various states, there are also uncertainties regarding the 
vertical coordination between the state and federal governments, as 
well as between state governments, local governments, and private 
property owners. For example, the initial draft of the Louisiana 
Master Plan absolved the State of responsibility for potentially 
important aspects of coastal restoration, stating, for example, that 
“it is the state’s policy that funding for federally authorized 
navigation channels is the sole responsibility of the federal 
government”137 and that “[f]unding for those projects should come 
at full federal expense.”138 By the final draft, the language had 
been changed to: “For purposes of this plan, we assumed that 
funding of these projects would be the responsibility of the federal 
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government.”139 The State does assert that it will “work to secure 
federal funding for projects shown to be important to the overall 
coastal strategy,”140 but uncertainty is inherent regarding whether 
the federal government will in fact be willing or able to do so.  
Similarly, the state and federal governments are wrangling over 
policy constraints relevant to wetland restoration. The Master 
Plan’s success depends heavily upon the successful use of 
sediment to restore and rebuild coastal wetlands, especially 
because it has allocated $24 billion for the task. Though dredged 
sediment is normally dumped in upland disposal sites or in the 
Gulf, since 2009 the State of Louisiana has required private parties 
who plan to dredge more than 25,000 cubic yards of sediment to 
place the dredged material in a coastal restoration project or pay a 
fee.141 Yet, federalism rears its ugly head once again and places 
large quantities of sediment beyond the project’s reach. In order to 
maintain navigation channels, the Corps of Engineers dredges 
sediment along the coast in greater amounts than any other entity 
in Louisiana (58 million cubic yards per year), and very little of 
this is diverted to wetlands.142 The Corps claims, according to the 
Master Plan, that its authorizations and budget do not allow the 
beneficial use of this dredged material for restoration projects.143 
Thus, this is a complication that will need to be addressed, though 
exactly how it will be resolved is unclear since the State absolves 
itself of any funding related to navigation channel maintenance 
handled by the federal government. 
Not only do entities up the chain, such as the federal 
government, foster uncertain political and legal outcomes, but so 
too do entities “down the chain,” such as local governments and 
private property owners. The nonstructural solutions to coastal 
land loss in Louisiana, as described in the Master Plan, are 
dependent upon amending the regulatory requirements of local 
land-use planning, building codes, flood damage prevention 
ordinances, and risk reduction project funding.144 The Master Plan 
describes the problem of “induced risk,” whereby structural 
solutions to protect from hurricane and flood damage “encourage 
unwise development in high risk areas.”145 Induced risk has been 
the norm in the past along the Louisiana coast, even though it 
“increases overall levels of risk and diminishes the effectiveness of 
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the protection structures themselves.”146 As a result, the Master 
Plan asserts that “wetland areas inside the hurricane protection 
system need to remain intact and undeveloped. Land use 
ordinances that contain nonstructural risk reduction measures . . . 
can ensure that our coastal investments bring maximum benefits 
while providing for economic growth.”147 This aspirational 
language establishes no mechanism for guaranteeing that these 
steps will actually be taken, at the state or subnational government 
levels, adding yet another layer of uncertainty as to whether all 
levels of government will take the necessary political and legal 
actions to successfully implement mitigation goals. 
In addition to political and legal uncertainty, the Master Plan 
acknowledges that 80% of the coast is privately owned and that 
“[t]he rights of these landowners, including mineral rights, must be 
acknowledged” as coastal projects are designed.148 As a result, 
“landowners should be partners with the state as projects are 
planned, designed, constructed, and operated.”149 While this sounds 
good in theory, in practice, relying on the cooperation of so many 
private property owners turns what would otherwise be an 
uncertainty into a certainty—states are certain to have difficulties 
procuring the necessary cooperation of private property owners to 
the degree that may be needed to have successful mitigation 
policies. 
Ultimately, in the mitigation context, uncertainty exists 
regarding the scientific projections that the mitigation policy relies 
upon, particularly in the areas of wetland restoration, sediment 
diversion, subsidence, and sea-level rise. Uncertainty also exists 
regarding the coordination and implementation of needed legal and 
political actions by the federal government, state and local 
governments, and private property owners. These compounded 
uncertainties should caution against relying too heavily on 
mitigation efforts in areas where, over the long-term view, 
adaptation would provide far more certainty. In these areas, policy-
makers should design policies that move society away from coastal 
lands likely to be lost, so the impacts of future coastal land loss on 
society will be reduced. To be clear, this is not to argue that coastal 
mitigation projects are uniformly poor policies, or even that certain 
short-term benefits gained by coastal restoration are not worthwhile 
investments. A wide variety of coastal restoration projects, including 
those that “protect vital coastal and marine habitat, restore species 
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that keep coastal systems healthy, remove invasive species, create 
shellfish spawning sanctuaries and re-establish water flows to 
estuaries,”150 may very well be successful. The same may be said for 
certain sediment diversion and wetland restoration projects. 
Similarly, tipping the scale too far in favor of coastal land loss 
adaptation may cause society to lose valuable economic and 
environmental benefits provided by the coast that may very well 
have turned out to be “fixable” and sustainable over the long term. 
Yet, as discussed in the next section, this Part is primarily concerned 
with the scale being tipped too far toward mitigation because it is 
the most politically expedient choice—a situation that distorts 
assessment of which approach is actually more appropriate. 
B. The Political Expediency of Choosing Mitigation over Adaptation 
The second reason to proceed with caution regarding coastal 
land loss mitigation policies is the tempting political expediency that 
may drive policy choices to implement coastal land loss mitigation 
over adaptation. A stark example of the political appeal for 
mitigation policies is the Louisiana Master Plan poll determining 
that 89% of Louisianans “believe that [Louisiana’s] coast is very 
important” and that 85% of Louisianans “believe it is smart to invest 
dollars in risk reduction and coastal restoration.”151 Importantly, the 
Master Plan notes that “[p]eople were not willing to give up on the 
coast, nor were they willing to write off areas at risk.”152 This 
demonstrates the intuitive appeal to a legislator for proposing and 
supporting mitigation policies aimed at restoring and saving the 
coast, especially if the public sees adaptation policies as “writing 
off” areas at risk. 
Contrast these results with a recent study undertaken by the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Sea 
Grant institutions of Texas, Louisiana, Florida, Mississippi, and 
Alabama. When polled about climate change generally, only about 
42% of coastal Louisianans said they were “very concerned,”153 
while only 46% said that the effect of climate change on their local 
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community would be “very or somewhat negative.”154 Around 35% 
said climate change would be neither negative nor positive, and 
approximately 18% actually said that the effects of climate change 
would be positive.155 So, though regionally Louisianans want to 
address the problems caused by climate change—accelerated coastal 
land loss—many fail to make the connection between land loss and 
climate change as one of the key drivers of the problem. 
Furthermore, the number of Louisianans statewide who are very 
concerned with climate change and who think its effects would be 
negative may well be lower than 42% and 46% respectively because 
those numbers only reflect coastal residents’ opinions—the NOAA 
and Sea Grant report found that coastal residents are more likely to 
believe climate change is happening than noncoastal residents.156 
Finally, while 89% of Louisianans statewide support coastal land 
loss mitigation policies, only around 66% of coastal residents 
support incentives to relocate from threatened areas, only 69% 
support limiting the types of structures built in high-risk areas, and 
only 29% support raising insurance rates for high-risk areas157—
each of which are key aspects of land loss adaptation. 
These numbers present a glimpse into how well-received might 
be the legislator who says, “We need to dramatically rethink and 
restructure how and where we undertake new development, and we 
need to transition current infrastructure to lower risk areas.” Given 
the long time scales, relative to human lifespans, that a policy-
maker’s decision takes to be proven “correct” or “incorrect,” one 
might say it would always be in the legislator’s best interest to 
propose mitigation over adaptation. The upside political and 
governance benefits are large, as the populace gets what it wants 
(though the populace may not be fully informed about what it 
needs), and any political downside is small because the policy-
maker is not likely to be around to witness the negative 
ramifications if mitigation policies ultimately fail in the future. Yet, 
none of these governance and political considerations provides any 
qualitative indication about whether either adaptation or mitigation 
policies are indeed the best option for a given area, which is, of 
course, what should drive decision-making, rather than political 
expediency. 
In addition to the effect that citizens’ opinions on threats to 
their regional coastal interests can have on policy-makers’ 
choices—a phenomena that acts as a type of endowment effect for 
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residents in states with important coastal resources—two other 
political considerations should cause policy-makers to approach 
mitigation cautiously. The first is simply the inertia that a 
mitigation policy gains once implemented. Once mitigation is 
relied upon to fortify coasts through large-scale engineering 
projects, with equally large-scale and corresponding economic 
investments, a preference arises to maintain that solution in 
perpetuity. Once billions of dollars are invested in levees, dams, 
seawalls, realigned channels, and wetland restoration, subsequent 
policy decisions are predisposed to protect those investments 
through even more mitigation measures. This acts as yet another 
distorting influence on the objective choice between adaptation and 
mitigation, as it becomes even more difficult to change course 
toward adaptation by letting those investments disappear.  
The second additional political consideration involves the basic 
political incentives that the U.S. economic system provides. The 
desire to develop in floodplains to grow local and national 
economies is one reason current mitigation measures, such as 
levees, have been implemented in the first instance, giving rise to 
political pressure to maintain those measures. For example, 
recently Bay St. Louis, Mississippi officials attempted to remove 
markers along the interstate demarking the high-water flood mark 
reached during Hurricane Katrina.158 As noted earlier, the extent of 
Katrina’s destruction was due in great part to the commercial 
development of floodplains that destroyed natural wetland buffer 
systems. This resulted in floodwaters in Bay St. Louis that actually 
reached the overhead span where Interstate 10 crossed over 
another highway.159 Even so, one Bay St. Louis councilmember 
stated that “the markers are detrimental to attracting businesses 
that might want to relocate [in the area], especially on undeveloped 
property around the interstate . . . .”160 In fact, “[s]ome city leaders 
envision the interstate property as a magnet that will pull in 
restaurants, motels, and big-box retailers.”161 Though these 
commercial establishments may very well be under water during 
the next major hurricane, local government officials and economic 
development interests are politically predisposed to forego a 
needed adaptation policy for the sake of achieving the short-term 
economic benefits that a mitigation policy may achieve.  
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Ultimately, political expediency based upon regional 
endowment, policy inertia, and economic development 
considerations distort the coastal land loss mitigation versus 
adaptation choice. As a result, policy makers should take those 
distortions into account and objectively assess their policy choices 
based on scientific and other tangible considerations, rather than 
merely political expediency.  
C. Failure to Adapt Past Land-Use Activities in the Coastal Zone 
has Contributed to the Need to Adapt or Mitigate Today 
The third and final reason why we should approach mitigation 
policies cautiously is the fact that failure to adapt past land-use 
activities in the coastal zone is one reason that mitigation and 
adaptation policies are now needed, lending support to the argument 
that adaptation now can avoid both costly mitigation policies, as 
well as preempt the need to adapt or mitigate in the future. 
Anecdotally, I recently purchased a home on Highland Road in 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The road is named “Highland” because 
historically it was the ridge where the natural floodplain of the 
Mississippi ended. As a result, people adapted to the natural 
circumstances by building their homes on the ridge—perhaps the 
ultimate form of adaptive, self-insuring land-use planning, achieved 
at low cost and with minimal effort (relative to building elsewhere, 
at least). This approach to development, however, has long since 
disappeared, as people now live in a world of levees and other 
structural solutions that places residential and commercial 
development within floodplains abutting structures that then must be 
maintained in perpetuity. As a result, society must make the difficult 
cost–benefit choice to flood one city because it would cause less 
damage than flooding another city—which happened recently along 
the Mississippi River.162 In other words, society is forced to mitigate 
flood damages because it failed to adapt long ago, choosing instead 
to develop in floodplains and to store a massive amount of energy 
behind levees ever-increasing in bulk. While such measures may be 
an option to bail out communities that undertake poor land-use 
planning along a river, it simply will not be a choice for combatting 
constant, irreversible, and relatively geographically uniform sea-
level rise in the coastal zone. 
Indeed, in the coastal zone we have exacerbated vanishing 
wetlands and rising seas by refusing in the past to adapt to their 
                                                                                                         
 162. Major General Michael Walsh as told to Bruce Grierson, How I 
Contained the Mississippi, DISCOVER MAG., Apr. 2012, at 18, available at 
http://discovermagazine.com/2012/apr/14-how-i-contained-the-mississippi. 
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existence and to structure society around them. Instead, we have 
replaced natural capital with human-built capital, and then invested 
untold economic resources into mitigating risks that we ourselves 
created. The irony of a recent Article titled “New Orleans Protection 
Plan Will Rely on Wetlands to Hold Back Hurricanes”163 is that, of 
course, Katrina’s damages were exacerbated because of the prior 
removal of wetlands through development activities. Though 
“[d]ecades ago the delta had thick, robust marshes and swamps that 
began behind the barrier islands and ran back for miles and miles to 
where towns and cities had sprouted,”164 those sprouting cities 
expanded and replaced these natural systems with development. The 
Louisiana Master Plan itself specifically acknowledges the role that 
manmade levees and floodgates have had in channeling the 
Mississippi River into the Gulf and starving the coastal ecosystem of 
fresh water and sediment, while oil and gas canal dredging has 
weakened marshes and allowed salt water infiltrationall of this 
compounded by sea-level rise, subsidence, and storms.165 The 
Master Plan acknowledges that “[o]ur current coastal crisis is due in 
large part to past decisions that have altered the natural processes of 
the coast. Both protection and restoration projects can support or 
impede these processes.”166 
With regard to the Mississippi River, the Master Plan 
acknowledges the inherent trade-off when human development and 
natural systems collide, which is an unavoidable aspect of coastal 
land loss mitigation policies: 
Since the late 1930s, the Mississippi River has been 
controlled by federally built levees. By reducing river flood 
risks and providing reliable navigation, the levees have 
allowed communities throughout the river’s watershed to 
thrive. But the levees have also deprived Louisiana’s 
wetlands of the sediment and fresh water that once built 
and sustained them. One of the many severe effects of this 
land loss disaster has been an increase in hurricane based 
flooding risk to communities. We must allow more river 
water and sediment to spread across the delta if we are to 
provide a sustainable future for the ecosystem, navigation, 
industry, and communities.167 
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This statement might be paraphrased: “We have mitigated in 
the past, and therefore must continue mitigating in the future to 
protect past land-use patterns.” An adaptation approach, on the 
other hand, uncouples significant anthropogenic impacts on natural 
systems in the coastal zone and does not attempt to extend artificial 
wetlands further—though reestablishment of wetlands that 
development has replaced may present an adaptive approach. 
Rather, adaptation prevents development from encroaching on 
natural coastal barriers already intact. Had this approach been 
taken in the past, adaptation or mitigation policies would be less 
necessary today. While adaptation policies may presently create 
significant economic and social difficulties, future residents of the 
coastal zone may very well prefer that we adapt where necessary, 
rather than continue a cycle of perpetually mitigating risks that we 
ourselves create. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Coastal land loss is an inevitable environmental challenge that 
society must face in a changing climate. Even so, society maintains 
legal and policy tools to address it, in the form of coastal land loss 
mitigation and adaptation. Many current environmental problems 
are caused by a failure to engage in policy-making that foregoes 
short-term interests for long-term societal well-being. So too may 
be the case if society fails to strike the appropriate balance between 
coastal land loss mitigation and adaptation policies. In many ways, 
mitigation is an unknown quantity compared with adaptation. We 
know that adaptation can and will be disruptive, and for the most 
part, we can pinpoint just how disruptive in real time based upon 
known data points. We also know exactly what measures will be 
necessary to allow a retreat from harm’s way, and we can choose 
just how far removed we want to be from high-risk coastal land 
loss areas. Mitigation, on the other hand, is fraught with 
uncertainty, and its viability and desirability is further distorted by 
a variety of political and economic considerations. Finally, a 
failure to err on the side of adaptation in the past has given rise to 
many current coastal land loss problems. 
Ultimately, a balance of adaptation and mitigation will 
necessarily be part of our response to coastal land loss. As we 
weigh those respective options, however, we should do so 
honestly, with consideration to future generations, and with an 
accounting of costs and benefits over long time scales—because in 
some circumstances it may very well be better to run on Scylla to 
avoid Charybdis.  
